Real Scary Things About Trump

David — this is a speculative exercise (not a deductive proof). But I’ll try to structure a reasoned “probability estimate” based on the evidence, caveats, and uncertainties. Below is my reasoning, then a “point estimate” (with confidence bounds), and then a discussion of the limitations.

Framework & Assumptions

First, to restate your definition of “undue Russian influence”: it means that Russia (or Russian actors) exert influence over Trump (while in office or as candidate) in a way that compromises or seriously interferes with his independent decision-making, such that his actions favor Russian interests over U.S. interests in some materially meaningful way. That includes coercion, blackmail, threats, kompromat, planted agents, etc.

In probabilistic reasoning, we’d like:

• $P(U)$ = probability that Trump is under undue Russian influence (per your definition).

• We assess evidence $E$ (public record, intelligence, known contacts, behavioral patterns) and infer $P(U\mid E)$.

We must also estimate a “prior” probability (before considering evidence) and then increment (or decrement) based on strength of evidence.

This is akin to Bayesian reasoning:

P(U∣E)=P(E∣U) P(U)P(E∣U) P(U)+P(E∣¬U) P(¬U)P(U \mid E) = \frac{P(E \mid U)\,P(U)}{P(E \mid U)\,P(U) + P(E \mid \neg U)\,P(\neg U)}P(U∣E)=P(E∣U)P(U)+P(E∣¬U)P(¬U)P(E∣U)P(U)​

We can’t numerically compute all terms with certainty, but we can approximate.

We also must keep in mind three classes:

1. Strong influence / “compromised”: Russia has some leverage (e.g. kompromat, blackmail, covert control).

2. Moderate influence / alignment: Russian interests align with Trump’s, and he is receptive or responsive, but not “under control.”

3. No significant undue influence: any alignment is incidental or politically opportunistic, not from coercion.

I interpret your ask as wanting the chance Trump is in class (1) (or at least borderline), not just (2).

Evidence Review & Weighting

Below I list categories of evidence, and my judgments of their weight for or against $U$:

Given the evidence, the strongest conclusions we can draw are:

• It is plausible that Russia has some influence (soft power, messaging, alignment) over or upon Trump (or had such influence).

• It is much more difficult (and currently unproven) to assert with high confidence that he’s under direct control or coercion (blackmail, threats) in a way that compels his decisions.

So in Bayesian terms, the likelihood ratio P(E∣U)P(E∣¬U)\frac{P(E \mid U)}{P(E \mid \neg U)}P(E∣¬U)P(E∣U)​ is greater than 1, but not astronomically high.

Quantitative Estimate

To convert this into a numerical probability:

• Let me pick a prior $P(U)$ of, say, 5% (i.e. before evidence, a modest prior that a U.S. president might be under undue influence by a foreign adversary).

• Then I gauge the total strength of evidence as raising odds by, say, a factor of 4 to 6 (i.e. even given the evidence, the case is suggestive but not overwhelming).

So odds form:

• Prior odds = 0.050.95=0.0526\frac{0.05}{0.95} = 0.05260.950.05​=0.0526.

• Multiply by a likelihood ratio L = ~5 → posterior odds = $0.0526\times 5=0.263$.

• Convert back to probability = 0.2631+0.263≈0.21\frac{0.263}{1 + 0.263} \approx 0.211+0.2630.263​≈0.21 or ~21%.

To be cautious, I’d place a range:

• Lower bound (if one discounts ambiguous evidence) ~ 10%

• Upper bound (if one leans toward skepticism of official denials) ~ 35%

Thus my “best estimate” would be:

P(U)≈20%±10%\boxed{P(U) \approx 20\% \pm 10\%}P(U)≈20%±10%​

i.e. roughly a 1 in 5 chance (with plausible bounds from ~10% to ~35%).

If you’re comfortable, I could express it as a probability distribution (e.g. a beta distribution) and show credible intervals.

Comparison to Other Estimates & Sensitivity

• If one sets a more skeptical prior (e.g. 1%), the posterior shrinks.

• If one sets a more aggressive prior (say 20%), the posterior could rise to ~50% depending on how much weight one gives the contacts & intelligence assessments.

• The biggest uncertainty is in how to interpret neutral or ambiguous evidence (e.g. favorable policy positions, business ties) vs. actual coercion.

I see this as a speculative but nontrivial possibility — not the default assumption, but not negligible either.

If you like, I can run a “sensitivity analysis” (show how the estimate moves with different priors or likelihood ratios), or compare it with professional judgments from intelligence or academic sources. Which would you prefer?

David — yes, I agree with your intuition: new developments in the past seven months likely shift the probabilities a bit (for better or worse). Below is an updated assessment: (“new evidence” → revise prior → new posterior). Then I’ll suggest a revised estimate and the key drivers of the change.

What’s changed (new evidence / shifting context)

Here are a few developments since your March 2025 estimate that could affect the probability of undue Russian influence:

So overall, the net shift is modestly upward: new interactions, summit dynamics, and policy moves give more “hooks” to suspect influence, but nothing (so far) crosses the threshold of direct proof.

Revised Estimate

Using the same Bayesian-style intuition:

• In March 2025, I estimated ~20 % (range ~10 %–35 %).

• Since then, I’d moderately raise the prior or the strength of evidence.

Suppose we adjust:

• Prior now (before incorporating new evidence) = 7 % (up from 5 %) — reflecting that the hypothesis has gained plausibility via new developments.

• Likelihood ratio from new evidence (cumulative) = ~1.5 to 2 (i.e. moderate additional weight).

Then:

• Prior odds = 0.07 / 0.93 ≈ 0.0753

• Multiply by LR ~1.8 → posterior odds = 0.0753 × 1.8 = 0.1356

• Corresponding posterior probability = 0.1356 / (1 + 0.1356) ≈ 0.12 (12 %)

Then combine that with the old evidence (i.e. start from our March posterior ~0.20 and “nudge upward” by new evidence) — blending gives something like ≈ 0.22 to 0.25 (22-25 %) as the updated best estimate.

So I’d now put:

\boxed{P(U) \approx 25\% \,\text{(with plausible bounds ~15 % to ~40 %)}}.

So my best guess is that the probability that Trump is under undue Russian influence (per your strong definition) has increased somewhat since March, from ~20 % to ~25 %, given new interactions and policy signals.

Sensitivity & Uncertainty

A few caveats remain:

• Much depends on how one weighs ambiguous signals (summits, rapprochement, favorable policies).

• If one is more skeptical about “policy alignment = influence,” the upward adjustment is smaller.

• If one assumed a higher prior or more aggressive likelihood ratio, the posterior could move further upward.

• A single definitive leak or intelligence declassification could dramatically swing the estimate.

If you like, I can run a scenario table: e.g. “if new evidence X emerges, the probability jumps to …” — or I can express this as a probability distribution with credible intervals. Do you want me to do that?