David, here’s the objective legal analysis you asked for, stated as a lawyer would, with the relevant statutes, constitutional limits, and treaty obligations.

Short Answer

Yes — in almost all circumstances, the scenario you describe would violate U.S. law, international law, and multiple treaties.
The Secretary of Defense has no unilateral authority to order lethal force against a foreign civilian outside armed-conflict conditions, and U.S. troops who carry out such an order would be acting unlawfully, even in international waters.

1. U.S. Constitutional and Statutory Limits

A. Constitution — Separation of Powers / War Powers

The use of military force against individuals not part of an armed conflict requires congressional authorization unless acting in national self-defense.

• The President (and by extension the Secretary of Defense) cannot lawfully initiate hostilities without statutory authority.

• See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (Congress holds power to declare war and authorize force).

Ordering the military to kill a private foreign citizen transporting drugs — not engaged in armed conflict — is not authorized by the Constitution.

B. Posse Comitatus / Use of Military for Law Enforcement

Although the foreign citizen is outside the U.S., the general legal framework still matters:

• 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act) — restricts the use of the Army and Air Force for law enforcement.

• Navy and Marine Corps are restricted by DoD regulations (DoD Directive 5525.5).

These rules demonstrate a strong prohibition against using U.S. armed forces as a law-enforcement killing force.

C. Lack of Statutory Authority to Kill Suspected Drug Traffickers

There is no federal statute authorizing the Secretary of Defense to use deadly military force against civilians engaged in suspected drug trafficking.

Contrast:

• Congress has authorized Coast Guard interdiction, seizure, and arrest of suspected drug traffickers.

  • 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act).

• But even the Coast Guard may not summarily kill drug traffickers; deadly force is permitted only in self-defense.

The military has no comparable statutory authority to kill civilians in these circumstances.

2. International Law and Treaty Violations

A. UN Charter (Treaty Law Binding on the U.S.)

Under the U.N. Charter, the use of force is lawful only if:

1. Authorized by the U.N. Security Council (Art. 42), or

2. Self-defense against an armed attack (Art. 51).

A foreign civilian transporting drugs on the high seas does not constitute an “armed attack.”

Thus, ordering troops to kill such a person is an unlawful use of force under international law.

B. International Waters / “High Seas” Law

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — widely considered customary international law — permits the following:

• Boarding and seizure of stateless vessels suspected of piracy, slavery, or unauthorized broadcasting.

• All other law enforcement on the high seas requires the flag state’s consent.

There is no authorization for lethal force against mere drug traffickers.

C. Extrajudicial Killing Prohibited (Customary International Law)

Killing a civilian without judicial process, outside armed conflict, is classified as an extrajudicial execution, prohibited by:

• Customary international law;

• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 6 (U.S. is a party).

These obligations apply even in international waters.

3. Orders to Kill Would Be an “Illegal Order”

Under U.S. military law:

• Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) requires service members to obey lawful orders only.

• Article 92, UCMJ – Unlawful orders must be disobeyed.

• Article 118, UCMJ – Unlawful killing can constitute murder.

Because the order violates U.S. law, treaty law, and international law, it is manifestly unlawful, so:

• Service members would be required not to carry it out.

• If they did carry it out, they could face criminal liability.

4. Summary for You, David

If the Secretary of Defense orders U.S. troops to kill a foreign civilian engaged in drug trafficking in international waters:

(1) It violates U.S. constitutional limits (Art. I § 8).

(2) It violates U.S. statutory and regulatory limits (Posse Comitatus; no authorization for military lethal force).

(3) It violates international law (UN Charter; ICCPR; customary international law).

(4) It violates maritime treaty obligations (UNCLOS principles).

(5) It would constitute an illegal order under the UCMJ.

In short: Yes, it is illegal — domestically and internationally.

If you’d like, David, I can also give you:

• A brief explanation of when the U.S. can legally use lethal force overseas;

• A comparison with drone-strike rules; or

• Relevant precedent (e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala or Hamdan v. Rumsfeld).

David, here’s the lawyer-level explanation of why the first strike — blowing up another nation’s boats in international waters — is already legally problematic, even before you ever get to the “second strike.”

News coverage tends to focus on the second strike because of proportionality and necessity concerns, but you’re right to ask why the first strike isn’t itself unlawful. Under international maritime law and treaty obligations, it usually is.

Below is the breakdown with the relevant law.

1. The High Seas Are NOT a Free-Fire Zone

Under international law, the high seas (international waters) are governed primarily by:

• U.N. Charter (binding treaty for the U.S.)

• Principles of customary international law

• UNCLOS maritime rules (customary, even though the U.S. hasn’t ratified the treaty)

The core rule:

No nation may use force against another nation’s vessels unless one of the narrow exceptions applies.

2. U.N. Charter — Article 2(4) (Use of Force Prohibition)

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits:

“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…”

Destroying a foreign nation’s vessels on the high seas is a use of force against that state.

Only two exceptions make it lawful:

(1) U.N. Security Council authorization

(2) Legitimate self-defense under Article 51

Drug trafficking, sanctions evasion, spiraling tensions, intelligence disputes — none of that qualifies.

If the target state has not launched or imminently threatened an armed attack, you do NOT get to use military force.

3. UNCLOS / Customary Maritime Law

Under high-seas law, nations generally have exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying their flag.

You may lawfully board or seize foreign vessels in international waters only for very specific reasons:

• Piracy

• Slave trading

• Unauthorized broadcasting

• Stateless vessels

• Flag-state consent

Carrying weapons, carrying drugs, or acting provocatively does not make a vessel “pirate.”
UNCLOS Art. 101 defines piracy narrowly: violent acts for private ends.

Thus, you cannot legally blow up another country’s boats just because their activities concern you.

4. Why, Then, the News Focuses on the “Second Strike”?

Because international law distinguishes between:

(A) The initial resort to force (jus ad bellum)

Was it legal to use force in the first place?

(B) The conduct of the attack itself (jus in bello / IHL)

Did it follow rules of proportionality and distinction?

Reporters often focus on (B) because proportionality violations are easier to explain to a general audience.

But from a legal standpoint, David, let’s be clear:

If the first strike lacks lawful justification under Article 51 self-defense or Security Council authorization, then the first strike is already unlawful.

Meaning the entire use of force is a violation of:

• U.N. Charter Article 2(4)

• Customary international law on use of force

• UNCLOS principles regarding foreign vessels

• Potentially ICCPR Art. 6 (right to life)

5. The “Second Strike” Often Looks Worse Because…

A second strike after an initial attack may involve:

• Hitting rescue workers

• Hitting fleeing personnel

• Hitting non-combatant or dual-use targets

• Striking after the threat is neutralized

• Violating the IHL requirement of distinction

• Violating the IHL requirement of proportionality

• Violating the requirement of military necessity

So the second strike can be a deeper violation —
but the first strike is still illegal unless it fits the narrow exceptions.

6. So… Why Isn’t Media Calling the First Strike Illegal?

Not because it’s legal.
But because:

1. Politicians avoid admitting an unlawful initial use of force.

2. Countries often claim “self-defense” even when it’s extremely tenuous.

3. News outlets default to government framing unless international law experts call them out.

4. “Second strike against rescuers” is easier for the public to understand as clearly wrong.

But legally, David:

Destroying another country’s boats in international waters is almost always unlawful unless:

• they attacked first, or

• they presented an imminent armed threat

Drug running, sanctions evasion, or even hostile intent do not qualify.

If you want, I can also walk you through:

• When boarding foreign vessels in international waters is allowed

• The international precedent on naval self-defense

• The Caroline doctrine and “imminence”

• Whether U.S. domestic law (e.g. AUMFs) could justify such force

Just let me know, David.

David, UNCLOS stands for:

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

It is the major international treaty that governs:

• territorial seas

• exclusive economic zones

• rights of navigation

• high-seas conduct

• continental shelves

• rules for boarding, seizure, and jurisdiction over ships

Even though the United States has never formally ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. government (including the Navy) accepts almost all of it as customary international law, meaning it treats most of the rules as binding.

If you want, I can give you a short summary of the key provisions that matter for maritime interdiction and use of force on the high seas.

David, here’s the straight legal answer, with the relevant U.S. case law, Executive Branch statements, DoD practice, and Senate records.

You asked whether the United States accepts as binding the parts of UNCLOS that would prohibit the Navy from destroying another nation’s vessels in international waters absent self-defense.

1. Although the U.S. has NOT ratified UNCLOS, it expressly accepts the navigation and high-seas rules as “customary international law” and therefore legally binding.

This is not vague policy — it is stated in:

• U.S. Supreme Court precedent

• U.S. Court of Appeals decisions

• Executive Branch (State Department & DoD) official statements

• Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports

Let’s walk through each source.

2. U.S. Supreme Court — The Charming Betsy Canon

Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)

The Supreme Court held that U.S. statutes must be interpreted (where possible) not to violate international law.

This canon has been repeatedly reaffirmed.

Meaning: If high-seas attacks violate customary international law, U.S. courts must construe U.S. statutes not to authorize them unless Congress stated otherwise.

3. U.S. Courts Recognize UNCLOS Navigation Rules as Customary International Law

United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D.P.R. 1997)

Court held that key UNCLOS maritime rules reflect customary international law.

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969)

(Interpreting similar pre-UNCLOS conventions.)
SCOTUS held that customary maritime limits (territorial sea, continental shelf rules) bind the U.S. absent contrary statute.

United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569 (1992)

Court again relied on international customary law for maritime boundaries.

Application:
The U.S. judiciary consistently treats international law of the sea (including rules UNCLOS later codified) as binding customary law.

4. Executive Branch — Repeated, Explicit Acceptance of UNCLOS as Customary International Law

A. Reagan Administration (1983) — Statement on Oceans Policy

President Reagan rejected Part XI of UNCLOS but accepted the rest as binding customary law, including:

• High-seas freedoms

• Right of navigation

• Exclusive flag-state jurisdiction over vessels

• Prohibition on using force except in self-defense

This is the cornerstone policy still cited today.

B. Navy JAG / DoD Law of War Manual

The Department of Defense explicitly states:

• “Most of UNCLOS reflects customary international law.”

• U.S. naval operations must comply with these customary rules.

• Use of force at sea is governed by self-defense, consistent with UNCLOS and the U.N. Charter.

C. U.S. State Department

Statements in annual “Limits in the Seas” reports confirm that UNCLOS navigation and enforcement rules are legally binding as custom.

5. The United States Accepts These Specific UNCLOS Rules (Custom) That Forbid Sinking Foreign Vessels Absent Self-Defense

A. Exclusive Flag-State Jurisdiction (UNCLOS arts. 92–94)

Only the nation whose flag a ship flies may exercise enforcement control on the high seas.

B. Prohibition on Using Force Except in Strict Self-Defense

Derived from:

• UNCLOS arts. 88, 301

• U.N. Charter art. 2(4) and 51

• Customary law (the Caroline self-defense standard)

C. “Right of Visit” Limited to Specific Crimes (UNCLOS arts. 99–110)

You may only board or seize in cases of:

• piracy

• slave trafficking

• illegal broadcasting

• stateless vessels

• flag-state consent

Drug trafficking does NOT qualify.

D. No unilateral lethal force against foreign civilian vessels

The U.S. Navy’s own Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states:

“Use of force against foreign vessels on the high seas is lawful only in self-defense or as otherwise authorized by international law.”

That rule is lifted from UNCLOS and custom.

6. So, Would the U.S. Accept That the Navy Violated Binding Law Here?

YES — IF the Navy struck foreign state-flagged vessels in international waters without:

• self-defense, or

• U.N. Security Council authorization, or

• flag-state consent.

Then it violated:

1. Customary international law

2. UNCLOS provisions accepted as custom

3. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (binding on the U.S.)

4. Domestic law via the Charming Betsy canon

5. DoD’s own law-of-war rules

The first strike would be unlawful even before considering the “second strike.”

7. Bottom Line for You, David

Even without ratifying UNCLOS, the United States has — by court decisions, Executive policy, and military doctrine — bound itself to the very UNCLOS rules that prohibit:

• Sinking or blowing up another nation’s vessels on the high seas

• Unless acting under Article 51 self-defense or U.N. authorization

Therefore, what the Navy did in your hypothetical (or the real-world scenario being reported) would be illegal under the very rules the U.S. says it follows.

If you want, I can give you:

• A list of the exact UNCLOS articles the U.S. treats as binding

• The U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook citations

• A self-defense analysis applying the Caroline standard

Just say the word, David.

David, here’s the lawyer-level analysis for the revised scenario, where the killing occurs inside U.S. waters (territorial sea). I’ll give you the controlling constitutional provisions, statutes, treaties, and case law.

SHORT ANSWER

Yes — the order is unlawful, and the killing would violate:

(1) The U.S. Constitution

(2) Federal criminal law (18 U.S.C. — homicide statutes)

(3) The Posse Comitatus Act / DoD regulations

(4) U.S. maritime statutes governing interdiction

(5) International law, including the U.N. Charter and the ICCPR

(6) The Uniform Code of Military Justice (illegal order doctrine)

U.S. territorial waters do not expand military authority to kill civilians. In fact, the legal constraints get tighter, not looser.

1. Applicable Constitutional Limits

A. Due Process Clause (5th Amendment)

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government may not kill someone outside of armed conflict unless:

• there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury, AND

• lethal force is strictly necessary.

This flows from:

• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

• Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

Even though Garner involved police, its constitutional reasoning (deadly force only against a significant threat) applies to any state actor, including military troops used domestically.

Drug trafficking is not an imminent threat of death. Therefore, deadly force is unconstitutional.

2. Domestic Territorial Waters = Full Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

Within U.S. territorial waters (12 nautical miles):

Federal criminal law applies fully.

Thus, if a U.S. service member kills a foreign civilian without legal justification, that act can constitute:

• 18 U.S.C. § 1111 — Murder (federal jurisdiction)

• 18 U.S.C. § 1112 — Manslaughter

The Secretary of Defense cannot immunize a killing that federal law defines as homicide unless Congress provides explicit authorization — and Congress has not done so.

3. Posse Comitatus Act & DoD Restrictions

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act)

Prohibits using the Army or Air Force to execute domestic laws unless expressly authorized by Congress.

DoD regulations extend this restriction to:

• Navy

• Marine Corps

See:

• DoD Directive 5525.5

• DoD Instruction 3025.21

Thus, using U.S. troops to enforce drug laws in U.S. waters — let alone to kill suspects — clearly violates federal law.

The authorized entity for maritime drug enforcement is the Coast Guard, under:

• 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act)

The military lacks such authority.

4. Maritime Law Does NOT Permit Lethal Force

Even the Coast Guard — which does have law-enforcement power — may use deadly force only when:

• necessary for self-defense

• necessary to protect others from imminent harm

See:

• 14 U.S.C. § 522 (Coast Guard law-enforcement authority)

• Coast Guard Use of Force Policy

Drug smuggling is not justification for lethal force.

If even the Coast Guard cannot kill a drug transporter simply for transporting, the Navy certainly cannot.

5. International Law Still Applies Inside U.S. Waters

A. U.N. Charter Art. 2(4) (Use-of-force prohibition)

Still prohibits unnecessary killing of a foreign national unless:

• justified by self-defense, or

• conducted under lawful domestic law procedures.

B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

The U.S. is a party.
Article 6 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life.

Killing a non-threatening drug courier is the definition of “arbitrary” under ICCPR jurisprudence.

6. UCMJ — Illegal Order Doctrine

UCMJ Art. 92 — Orders must be lawful

A service member must refuse an unlawful order.

UCMJ Art. 118 — Murder

Unlawful killing of a non-belligerent inside U.S. jurisdiction is murder under the UCMJ.

Thus:

• The Secretary’s order is unlawful.

• Troops obeying it could be court-martialed for murder.

• Troops refusing it would be legally correct.

7. Summary for You, David

If U.S. troops kill a foreign civilian in U.S. territorial waters based solely on:

• suspicion of drug trafficking, or

• belief that drugs might be bound for the U.S.,

then the act violates:

Constitutional law:

• 5th Amendment Due Process
• Limits on deadly force (Garner)

Federal statutory law:

• 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder)
• 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus)
• No statutory authorization for military lethal force

International law:

• U.N. Charter Art. 2(4)
• ICCPR Art. 6
• Customary rules on law enforcement at sea

Military law:

• UCMJ Art. 92 (illegal order)
• UCMJ Art. 118 (murder)

Being within U.S. waters makes the military use of lethal force more illegal, not less.

If you’d like, David, I can also walk through:

• How the Coast Guard can legally interdict vessels

• The rare situations where the navy may lawfully kill someone in U.S. waters

• A comparison with the FBI “rules for deadly force”

Just let me know.

David, here is the clean, lawyer-level statement of all the situations — and only those situations — where U.S. military or law-enforcement personnel may lawfully use deadly force inside U.S. waters.

I’ll cover the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, FBI, and all state and federal law-enforcement agencies separately, using the controlling statutes, constitutional standards, and case law.

I. THE GENERAL RULE: Deadly Force Is Almost Never Lawful

Under U.S. constitutional law, all government agents (military or civilian) may use deadly force inside U.S. territory only when:

There is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to an officer or another person, and deadly force is necessary to stop that threat.

This standard is constitutional, coming from:

• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
  (“Deadly force cannot be used to stop a fleeing suspect unless there is probable cause they pose a significant threat of death or serious injury.”)

• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
  (Reasonableness of force under the 4th Amendment.)

Inside U.S. waters, these cases apply in full.

Everything else is an exception.

II. U.S. NAVY — When Can the Navy Kill Someone in U.S. Waters?

The Navy is not a domestic law-enforcement agency and is prohibited by law from engaging in routine enforcement.

The Navy may use deadly force ONLY in these rare situations:

1. Self-defense (individual or unit)

This is the big one.
If a vessel or person is firing on a Navy ship or personnel, deadly force is lawful.

• DoD Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

• UCMJ

• Inherent right of self-defense — recognized in The Caroline standard

2. Defense of others

If a civilian or Coast Guard officer is under imminent threat of death, a Navy unit may intervene.

3. Protecting a “vital national security asset”

Extremely rare and narrowly defined.
Examples:

• A submarine leaving or entering Kings Bay or Bangor

• Nuclear weapons transportation

• High-security naval installations

Deadly force is permissible only when an intruder’s actions threaten catastrophic harm.

Source:
DoD Instruction 5210.56 (Deadly Force and the Use of Force Policy)

4. Counterterrorism in U.S. waters (if authorized by the President or Congress)

This must be:

• a genuine terrorism situation, AND

• specifically authorized via statutory or Presidential directive.

Examples:

• Stopping a vessel attempting to ram and explode against a ship or building.

5. Defense against an attack on U.S. warships (law of the sea)

Even inside U.S. waters, a Navy ship is a sovereign immune vessel.
Deadly force is legal if attacked or threatened by:

• a hostile vessel

• small-boat swarm

• actors attempting to seize or sabotage the ship

III. COAST GUARD — When Can the Coast Guard Kill?

The Coast Guard does have domestic law-enforcement authority.
Its deadly force rules are strictly defined in:

• 14 U.S.C. § 522

• Coast Guard Use of Force Policy (COMDTINST M5560.10D)

Coast Guard may use deadly force only when:

1. Self-defense

Threat of death/serious injury to the officer.

2. Defense of others

Threat of death/serious injury to another person.

3. To prevent a “grave and imminent threat” to the United States

Examples:

• A vessel believed to be carrying a bomb

• A vessel attempting to ram a ship, platform, or bridge

• Attacks similar to the USS Cole bombing

4. To stop a vessel “posing an imminent threat” that cannot be stopped otherwise

This is extremely rare and must satisfy strict criteria:

• The vessel must present imminent danger of loss of life.

• Warning shots and disabling fire must be insufficient or impossible.

Drug trafficking does not qualify.

Important:

The Coast Guard may NOT use deadly force:

• to stop drug smugglers,

• to enforce customs laws,

• to enforce immigration laws,
  unless the smugglers pose a deadly threat.

IV. FBI and FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The FBI and all other federal agencies use the Attorney General’s Deadly Force Policy, which states:

Federal agents may use deadly force ONLY when:

1. They have probable cause to believe the suspect poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury, AND

2. Deadly force is necessary to stop that threat.

This is the same standard as Garner and Graham.

Additionally:

Federal agents may NOT kill someone:

• solely for committing a felony

• solely to prevent escape

• solely for drug trafficking

• solely for smuggling

• solely for violating maritime law

Unless the suspect poses an immediate deadly threat.

V. STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Same rule:

Deadly force is allowed only under Garner and Graham.

States cannot constitutionally go beyond the federal constitutional standard.

VI. ULTRA-RARE SPECIAL LEGITIMATE EXCEPTIONS

These situations are lawful but extremely uncommon:

1. Shooting to prevent a terrorist attack (bomb, ramming, mass casualty threat)

Applicable to any federal or state officer or military member assisting with domestic defense.

2. Prison escape scenarios involving violent felons with weapons

Still requires imminent threat.

3. Hostage rescue situations

Deadly force authorized if hostages are in imminent danger.

4. A vessel threatening critical infrastructure

Examples:

• Naval shipyards

• Nuclear power plants

• Critical refinery or LNG terminal

• Major bridges or tunnels

Only if there is a specific, imminent deadly threat.

VII. WHAT IS NOT A LAWFUL BASIS FOR DEADLY FORCE IN U.S. WATERS

NOT LAWFUL TO KILL JUST BECAUSE:

• The person is smuggling drugs

• The person is undocumented

• The vessel refuses to stop

• The vessel is engaged in illegal fishing

• The vessel is violating customs laws

• The vessel is evading boarding

• The vessel is entering or leaving U.S. waters unlawfully

• The Secretary of Defense believes they are a threat

• The vessel is foreign and suspected of hostile intent

None of these constitute an imminent threat of death, which is the constitutional requirement.

VIII. Bottom Line for You, David

Inside U.S. waters, deadly force is lawful only in these circumstances:

• Self-defense

• Defense of others

• Preventing an imminent terrorist or mass-casualty attack

• Defense of critical security assets

• Hostage rescue or similar emergencies

• When the person poses an imminent threat of death

Nothing else qualifies — not drug trafficking, not smuggling, not fleeing, not disobeying orders.

This applies to:

• the Navy

• the Coast Guard

• the FBI

• every federal agency

• every state law-enforcement agency

If you want, David, I can give you:

• the exact text of the DoD, Coast Guard, and FBI deadly-force policies

• examples of real cases where deadly force at sea WAS upheld

• the legal consequences of violating these rules (federal homicide, UCMJ murder, and international law liability)

Just tell me which direction you want to go.

Short version:

1. Yes – the Trump administration is clearly leaning on two ideas:

   • an executive order that designates cartels as terrorist organizations (EO 14157), and

   • the claim that these boats are run by “narcoterrorist” / terrorist organizations like Tren de Aragua and the ELN.

2. No – even if you take those claims at face value, neither the executive order nor a terrorist designation actually makes these boat strikes lawful under U.S. or international law.

I’ll walk through each of your numbered questions.

(1) Are they saying the strikes are allowed under some Trump “executive order”?

What’s actually out there

• On January 20, 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14157, “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” WilmerHale+1

• Under that EO, State has designated Tren de Aragua, MS-13, Sinaloa, CJNG, etc. as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). WilmerHale+1

• Reporting on the naval buildup and Operation Southern Spear notes that the administration explicitly ties the strikes to these FTO designations and to the “war on cartels.” AP News+1

More specifically:

• A SOUTHCOM/DoD article quotes Hegseth discussing EO 14157 as the framework for designating cartels as terrorists and then immediately pivoting to the boat campaign, saying the designation “brings new options” and warning “don’t get in a boat, because it’s going to end poorly for you.” U.S. Southern Command+1

So yes, they are clearly politically and rhetorically linking the strikes to Trump’s executive order and the cartel-terror designations.

But when pressed on the legal authority in more formal settings, what they have told Congress is slightly different:

• In a notification to Congress, the administration said the U.S. is in a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels that it has designated as terrorist organizations, and that the cartels’ drugs killing Americans constitutes an “armed attack” that justifies the use of military force. CBS News+1

• Trump himself has said, “We have legal authority. We’re allowed to do that,” but he ties that to the harm drugs cause, not to a specific EO section. CBS News+1

Crucially, as of today:

There is no public evidence that the administration has pointed to a specific section of EO 14157 and said “this is what authorizes kinetic military strikes.”

The EO is being used as political and legal backdrop (designations and sanctions), while the formal claim of strike authority is Article II + “armed conflict” with terrorist cartels, not “the EO lets us bomb boats.”

(2) Are they justifying the attacks on the theory these boats are “terrorist organization” activities?

Here, the answer is clearly yes.

Examples from current reporting:

• The Wikipedia/summary of the campaign (pulling from multiple outlets) notes that the administration alleges the vessels are operated by “groups it designated as narcoterrorists, including the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN).” Wikipedia

• In an early Fox interview, Hegseth said about the first Venezuelan boat:

  “We knew exactly who was in that boat… [it] was [the] Tren de Aragua narcoterrorist organization, designated by the United States….” ABC News+1

• Trump, Rubio and State have repeatedly described these targets as:

  • “narcoterrorist boats,”

  • “members of Tren de Aragua,” and

  • “foreign terrorist organizations such as Tren de Aragua and Cartel de los Soles.” Wikipedia+2AP News+2

• The CBS piece you and I both care about notes that in its message to Congress, the administration explicitly claimed a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels it has designated as terrorist organizations, and referred to those killed as “unlawful combatants.” CBS News+1

So:

Yes. The official public story is that these boats are run by “narcoterrorist” organizations that the U.S. has designated as FTOs/SDGTs, and that this supposedly turns a drug-smuggling issue into an armed-conflict / terrorism paradigm.

(3) Even if that’s what they claim, does an EO or terrorist designation actually make the strikes lawful?

Short answer: No.

Even if you grant every factual premise they assert (which a lot of intel folks and legal experts don’t), an executive order and terrorist designations do not supply lawful authority for these boat strikes, for two big reasons:

3A. Under U.S. domestic law

1. Executive orders cannot create war powers out of thin air.

   • EO 14157 is grounded in existing statutes like 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (FTO designations) and 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (IEEPA sanctions authority). WilmerHale

   • Those laws let the President designate groups and impose sanctions / criminalize material support, not launch military attacks.

   • An EO can only direct how existing authority is used; it cannot override the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, or the UN Charter.

2. FTO/SDGT designation ≠ Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).

   • Designation triggers things like:

     • 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (material support to FTOs),

     • civil liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act,

     • sanctions and asset freezes. WilmerHale+1

   • It does not say “you may now shoot their boats on the high seas.”

   • As one of the experts quoted in CBS says:

     “There’s nothing magic about calling something a terrorist organization that then gives the president the authority to respond militarily.” CBS News

3. War Powers Resolution and Article I problems.

   • The CBS piece notes that the administration’s own notification to Congress triggered the War Powers Resolution clock and the 60-day period expired without congressional authorization, yet strikes continued. CBS News+1

   • So even if you accept the “non-international armed conflict” framing, continuing a campaign of lethal strikes without a specific AUMF is on very shaky domestic ground.

4. You don’t get to redefine “armed attack” just by saying “drugs kill lots of Americans.”

   • Trump has repeatedly claimed that overdoses (and inflated overdose numbers) amount to an “assault” or “armed attack” on the American people, which supposedly confers legal authority. Wikipedia+1

   • That may be politically potent, but under both domestic and international law it’s not how “armed attack” is understood.

Net:

Even if an internal OLC memo exists, an EO plus FTO designations, without a specific AUMF and without an actual or imminent armed attack, does not satisfy U.S. constitutional and statutory requirements for using military force this way.

3B. Under international law

Designation also doesn’t fix the UN Charter / law-of-the-sea problems:

1. UN Charter, Article 2(4) and 51.

   • The Charter prohibits use of force except:

     • with Security Council authorization, or

     • in self-defense against an armed attack.

   • A drug-smuggling boat is not an “armed attack” in the sense the ICJ or state practice uses that term, and multiple experts have said exactly that in analyzing these strikes. Wikipedia+1

2. You can’t convert “crime” into “war” just by sticking the word “terrorist” on it.

   • CBS quotes LOAC experts (Schmitt, Goodman, Bridgeman, Finucane, Hansen) saying:

     • there is no international or non-international armed conflict here because the cartels do not meet LOAC criteria for organized armed groups, and

     • you cannot treat them as enemy combatants simply by designating them as terrorists. CBS News+1

3. Maritime law / UNCLOS–type rules.

   • High-seas and even EEZ law only allow interference with foreign vessels in narrow cases: piracy, slave trading, stateless vessels, hot pursuit from territorial waters, etc. Drug smuggling and terrorism designations don’t magically expand that. Wikipedia+1

Bottom line internationally:

A U.S. executive order and a U.S. terrorist designation cannot, as a matter of international law, authorize what the UN Charter and customary law forbid. They are domestic instruments; they don’t change the rules of the game.

Putting it all together in your three questions

1. Are they claiming the strikes are permissible under an “executive order”?

   • They are claiming political and strategic grounding in EO 14157 and the resulting FTO/SDGT designations.

   • But when they make legal arguments, they talk in terms of Article II powers, self-defense, and a supposed “non-international armed conflict” with cartels, not “Section X of EO 14157 authorizes this.” CBS News+2Wikipedia+2

2. Are they claiming the boats are “terrorist organization” activities?

   • Yes, very explicitly. They repeatedly say the boats are operated by Tren de Aragua or other designated “narcoterrorist” groups, and that the people killed are “terrorists” or “unlawful combatants.” Wikipedia+3ABC News+3Wikipedia+3

3. Would such an executive order or terrorist designation, even if relied on, be valid and lawful as a basis for these strikes?

   • No. An EO and an FTO designation may be valid as sanctions tools, but they do not themselves authorize military force and they cannot cure:

     • the lack of a specific AUMF under U.S. law,

     • War Powers Resolution issues, or

     • the UN Charter / LOAC problems with sinking foreign civilian boats that are not engaged in an armed attack on the U.S.

So even accepting their own framing, the better legal view (and the consensus among mainstream LOAC / national security folks quoted so far) is:

The designations and EO 14157 do not make these boat strikes lawful. They are, at best, a thin legal fig leaf over operations that are very likely unlawful under both U.S. and international law.

If you’d like next, David, I can:

• walk through how Hamdan, Al-Bihani, and post-9/11 AUMFs differ from what Trump is trying to do here, or

• sketch how a future administration or Congress could unwind or investigate these strikes (including potential exposure under the Alien Tort Statute / ATS and foreign tribunals).