[Editor’s Note: The blog post below is based on a newspaper article written by David Dixon Lentz which originally appeared in the Ashland Herald Progress (which, unfortunately, has since gone out of business) in three parts in late 2015. It is about the very underappreciated Battle of the North Anna River fought just north of Richmond during the final year of the Civil War (between the more famous battles at Spotsylvania Courthouse and Cold Harbor.) It is reprinted here while we work on our next video, which supplements and updates our previous webpages and videos on the Federal Reserve Bank, monetary policy and interest rates.]
Part I
“On May 25 and 26 cannon and sharpshooter fire was almost constant across the river. During this period the Union artillery, firing at the rate of about three rounds per minute, hurled at least 3,000 rounds into these ridges and ravines. On May 26, Union gunners opened fire with three cohorn mortars, but failed to silence Confederate artillery.” Stop 10 (Gray line), North Anna Battlefield, Doswell, Virginia Little did I know when I stopped my car just on the north side of the bridge spanning the North Anna River on U.S. Route 1 several months ago that I was in the middle of a battlefield where the two greatest armies of the Civil War once squared off for four days of what, I’ve ultimately learned, was a very serious battle. What made this realization so astounding was that I was once a student at nearby Randolph-Macon College and had travelled this road quite often over the years. Unfortunately, most of my college history courses centered on world history; my last American history course being in the tenth grade. I made the discovery that a battle had taken place at North Anna only because I feared that I had a flat tire and was forced to the side of the road where I saw a small sign indicating that General Robert E. Lee and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had fought there. In any event, the episode led me to investigate a battle that I found, upon investigation, deserves far more attention than it usually gets. On many levels, it is very difficult to understand why the Battle of North Anna is not more famous than it is. After all, the fighting was, in fact, intense. This is evidenced by the fact that the subject of the barrage quoted at the beginning of this article concerns just the third and fourth days of the battle. Moreover, the two armies, and the 120,000 troops of which they comprised, were led by the two most famous commanders of the Civil War, Lee and Grant, the latter, of course, ultimately becoming a President of the United States. These two opposing forces faced off across a relatively narrow and largely fordable shallow river just under 30 miles north of downtown Richmond on what was the major road between Washington and Richmond. Perhaps the Battle of the North Anna isn’t better known because it was sandwiched between other more famous battles, such as the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Courthouse, on the one hand, both of which occurred before North Anna, and Cold Harbor and then Petersburg which occurred after. Perhaps it’s because there were “only” between four and five thousand casualties at North Anna. But, as I learned, these misleading casualty counts can be explained in large part because many of the troops were protected by the miles of trenches that they had dug that eventually presaged the fighting at both the Siege of Petersburg and, much later, during World War I. Severe thunderstorms also helped to keep casualties somewhat lower as did Grant’s ultimate realization that it was too dangerous to continue his assault on Lee’s commanding position above the river. In any event, it’s hard to argue that North Anna wasn’t a major battle. What happened? Prelude to the Battle Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant took command of all Union armies on March 3, 1864, less than three months before meeting Lee at North Anna. He and President Lincoln were of one mind. Grant would relentlessly engage Lee in battle in hopes of exhausting Lee’s depleted army, capturing Richmond and bringing the war to a quick, but belated, end. Lee, though still licking his wounds from Gettysburg, was initially able to hold his own against Grant in the first two rounds of what became known as Grant’s Overland Campaign. At the battle of the Wilderness and then at Spotsylvania Courthouse almost 40 miles north of North Anna, Lee’s army had stymied the conqueror of Vicksburg. After Spotsylvania, in May of 1864, Grant took direct aim at Richmond itself hoping on the way to capture a strategic railroad crossing at Hanover Junction located in what is now Doswell. This meant that Grant’s forces, the entire Army of the Potomac and Lt. Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps, would be coming directly down the primary road between Washington and Richmond and, if they could capture Hanover Junction, be positioned astride a critical supply line less than 30 miles from Richmond. A more direct and ominous threat to the Confederate capital could not have been imagined.
Part II
MAY 23
By the evening of May 22, 1864, Grant’s army began arriving on the north bank of the North Anna in the areas along Ox Ford and Telegraph Roads except that the Confederates still held a small dug-in fortification at what became known as Henagan’s Redoubt. This redoubt guarded the north end of what was then known as the Chesterfield Bridge, which spanned the river on the old Telegraph Road. Grant, meanwhile, headquartered in nearby Carmel Church.
Telegraph Road
At the time of the battle, the Chesterfield Bridge stood less than a quarter of a mile west of the current bridge over U.S. Route 1. (Present day U.S Route 1 has replaced much, but not all, of the old Telegraph Road.) On May 23rd, two Union brigades from Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps overran Henagan’s redoubt in a successful effort to capture the Chesterfield Bridge. Col. John W. Henagan’s brigade of South Carolinians retreated across the bridge but Federal troops, fearing their position would be too exposed, chose not to chase Henagan across the river. They decided to wait until the next day to attempt the crossing. Interestingly, during the Telegraph Road fighting, Union artillery fire hit the Fox House where General Lee was directing the battle. Lee himself was almost hit by one of the rounds.
Ox Ford
Meanwhile at 11 a.m. of that same day, elements of Brig. Gen. William H. Mahone’s division raced to stop an attempted Union advance across the North Anna at Ox Ford. This was at the center of what was to become a six-mile wide battlefield. Mahone ordered the placement of his Confederate cannon at a strategic position high on a point that appears to be about 80 to 100 feet above the Ox Ford crossing of the river. (The area today is apparently much more wooded than it was at the time of the battle.) It is readily apparent to anyone visiting this position at the top of what was to become Lee’s famous “inverted V” that any direct assault on that position from the Union side of the river would have been up an impossibly high and steep slope. From the inverted V, the Confederate field of fire is said to have covered the Chesterfield Bridge, Ox Ford and other points west towards Quarles Mill as well—a wide field of fire indeed.
Jericho Mill
On the afternoon of that same May 23, 1864, the Union’s V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, forded the North Anna River at Jericho Mill at the western end of the river and marched, initially uncontested, on to Fontaine Farm on the river’s south bank. Before long, however, Warren’s forces were attacked by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill’s III Corps. A serious battle broke out and, initially, it looked as though the Hill’s forces would force Warren’s troops back to the north side of the river. However, Warren’s men rallied and were able to establish a beachhead on the south side of the river.
There is some controversy regarding how it came to pass that Hill allowed the Federals to establish a position on the south bank of the river at Jericho Mill. Hill’s Third Corps had been guarding the east-west running Virginia Central Railroad along what is now Verdon Road. Hill had been told by Lee that Warren’s initial movements in the area were a mere feint. Hill did eventually commit his forces in strength at Jericho Mill. However, after Warren was able to establish a beachhead on the south bank of the river, Lee scolded Hill for not throwing all of his forces into the battle—to use Lee’s words, “as Jackson would have done.”
In response to Union advances, by the evening of May 23rd Lee’s forces were able to construct defensive earthworks several miles long. These earthworks ran from the nearby Little River, to the point mentioned above overlooking and opposite Ox Ford. They then turned southeast and ran a considerable distance toward Hanover Junction– thus forming Lee’s famous “inverted V.” The inverted V not only commanded high ground at its center, but it also acted as a force multiplier against Union forces who were split by it on both sides. A confident Lee said, “if I can get one more pull at [Grant], I will defeat him,”
MAY 24th, Telegraph Road
Early in the morning of the 24th, the Union’s II Corps easily crossed the Chesterfield Bridge against little resistance and was able to advance far enough down Telegraph Road south of the river to take the same Fox House where Lee had almost been hit the day before. Further east, the Confederates had managed to burn the RFP railroad bridge about a quarter mile away. Nevertheless, Union forces were still able to cross it and then later make a pontoon bridge that allowed them to cross the river in even greater numbers. The relative ease of Grant’s initial success gave him cause to believe that the Confederates were retreating.
Soon elements of the Hancock’s II Corps marched south along the RFP railroad, despite taking fire from rebel sharpshooters, until they reached earthworks defended by brigades from Alabama and North Carolina who were positioned just north of Hanover Junction. The rebels counter attacked and fierce fighting erupted. Thunderstorms, however, dampened gunpowder and eventually stalled the fighting near Verdon Road.
Jericho Mill
That same day to the West, Wright’s Union VI Corps crossed the North Anna at Jericho Mills in support of Warren’s V Corps who had established their beachhead there the night before. Federal troops were able to advance south to the Virginia Central Railroad line along present day Verdon Road. This is because by that time A.P. Hill’s forces had fallen back and dug in at the western leg of Lee’s inverted V.
Ox Ford
Meanwhile Grant, seeing the initial lack of resistance at Telegraph Road, and hearing of Warren’s advance in the West, mistakenly believed that rebel forces above Ox Ford only constituted a token force who were left solely for the purpose of covering what he thought was a retreating Lee. Thus, Grant ordered Burnside’s IX Corps to attempt to secure a river crossing at Ox Ford at the center of the battlefield. Burnside, wishing to avoid fire from Confederate guns, ordered Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden’s division to go upstream and west to Quarles Mill, which is between Jericho Mill and Ox Ford, to ford the river there. Crittenden was then to move east and to attack Ox Ford from the southern end of the river. The brigade spearheading this attack was led by Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, who was apparently intoxicated. He failed to follow orders to wait for additional troops and, instead, ordered an immediate assault on the western side of Lee’s inverted V. The result was a hail of Confederate bullets that caused Ledlie’s forces to retreat back in the direction of Quarles Mill. Here again, however, the fighting was stalled by severe thunderstorms.
Evening, May 24th
At the end of the day, Lee’s inverted V remained intact. Grant’s forces were divided into three parts along the river, and no portion of his army could easily support the other. Unfortunately, Lee himself had contracted a case of diarrhea during the fighting and was not able to direct a decisive counter attack. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, perhaps Lee’s most trusted Corps commander after the death of Stonewall Jackson a year earlier, had been severely wounded at the Wilderness and was not present to provide any needed leadership. Moreover, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had died almost two weeks earlier as a result of a wound received at Yellow Tavern. In any event, Union troops were now also digging in north of river.
MAY 25th and 26th
Sniper and the artillery duels continued for two more days. By the evening of May 26th, however, Grant grasped the risks faced by an army whose wings could not reinforce each other. As he had done at the Wilderness and again at Spotsylvania, Grant ordered his army to the East and then South around Lee’s right to what would be the Battle of Cold Harbor and then later, after crossing the James River, to the Siege of Petersburg.
Part III:
PUTTING TOGETHER A BATTLEFIELD
From Jericho Mill, on the far western part of battlefield, to the Richmond Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad crossing at the far eastern end, the area where the battle was fought measures about six miles long. In addition, troops built trenches and battled a mile or more south of the river itself. This, however, is only the southern portion of the battlefield, all of which is in Hanover County. Henagan’s Redoubt, Grant’s headquarters and the area where Grant’s army gathered and ultimately built trenches north of the river is also large. Those areas, however, are all located in Caroline County. Jurisdictional issues have thus inevitably contributed to the uncoordinated and piecemeal efforts to put together a complete battlefield park.
For example, Hanover County began acquiring lands, either outright or through conservation easements at least 25 years ago. In fact, the owner of the land on the south side of the Ox Ford crossing granted Hanover County a conservation easement in 1990 to use that area as a battlefield while retaining the underlying ownership interest. This is where Ledlie’s assault and the tip and western trenches of the inverted V are located and it is by far the best preserved portion of the battlefield. This is where the present day “Gray Trail” and “Blue Trail” are found. These trails are, however, only a very small portion of what was the total battlefield and focus almost exclusively on just the second day of fighting.
More recently, last year the Civil War Preservation Trust purchased 654 acres of the land where A.P. Hill unsuccessfully tried to stop Warren from crossing the river at Jericho Mill. There the Trust has actually taken title to the property. The former owners, however, have retained a life estate giving them the right to use a portion of the property acquired by the Trust during the sellers’ lifetime.
Unfortunately, the areas owned or controlled by the counties and the Civil War Trust are not connected. In fact, private owners still own by far the most land at the site of the Battle of North Anna.
Governmental; Nonprofit and Private Efforts
On the Caroline side of the North Anna, the only portion of the battlefield which has been acquired for battlefield purposes appears to be a small sliver of another piece of land acquired by the Civil War Trust last year at Jericho Mill. Unfortunately, no land has been acquired by the Civil War Trust or Hanover County directly south of the old Chesterfield Bridge or along U.S. Route 1. Moreover, any remains of the Chesterfield Bridge or Henagan’s Redoubt are not readily apparent to the casual visitor. Most of the old Telegraph Road has been abandoned where the Chesterfield Bridge was located.
The Civil War Trust, which is a nonprofit organization, employs two different strategies to acquire the lands necessary to preserve a battlefield. One is to take legal title outright in an actual transfer of title to the land. This is usually done either in an outright sale or the Trust takes title by gift from the donating owner. The other strategy that the Trust uses is to take a conservation easement, leaving title to the property with the original owner but with significant use restrictions.
Regarding the first strategy where the Trust takes full title, the Trust can either buy the land for full fair market value or take title by gift from the original owner. An offshoot of this approach, one which was employed by the Trust with respect to a portion of the Jericho Mill property, is the for the original owner to give the Trust a remainder interest in the property while allowing the original owner and his family to enjoy the use of the property during their lives.
By contrast, under the Trust’s conservation easement strategy, the original owner maintains title to the property and even has the right to use it but only for limited purposes because the conservation easement protects the land from both certain uses and from future development. Neither the present nor any future owner may place new structures on the property unless the structures or activities are for very limited purposes that minimize the impact on the land. In this regard, agricultural and ranching structures and activities are often permissible even under a conservation easement. Importantly, in most of all of these transactions, the selling and donating owners receive significant federal and State income, estate and property tax benefits.
Unfortunately, neither Hanover nor Caroline have made any formal plans to acquire any additional properties at any time in the near future. That is not to say, however, that they will not do so should an appropriate opportunity present itself.
Given that North Anna is a rural area along a major highway where present owners must be concerned about future development; that beneficial tax breaks are available; that conservation easements protect property against unwanted future development; and, that agricultural uses remain permissible under such easements, it’s hoped that other owners in the area investigate donating or selling land to one of several governmental or nonprofit entities who remain interested in preserving this great historical treasure.
[Editor’s Note: Some of the facts about the battlefield and its ownership etc may have changed since this article was first published.]