Hanover Junction
Part II
MAY 23
By the evening of May 22, 1864, Grant’s army began arriving on the north bank of the North Anna in the areas along Ox Ford and Telegraph Roads except that the Confederates still held a small dug-in fortification at what became known as Henagan’s Redoubt. This redoubt guarded the north end of what was then known as the Chesterfield Bridge, which spanned the river on the old Telegraph Road. Grant, meanwhile, headquartered in nearby Carmel Church.
Telegraph Road
At the time of the battle, the Chesterfield Bridge stood less than a quarter of a mile west of the current bridge over U.S. Route 1. (Present day U.S Route 1 has replaced much, but not all, of the old Telegraph Road.) On May 23rd, two Union brigades from Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps overran Henagan’s redoubt in a successful effort to capture the Chesterfield Bridge. Col. John W. Henagan’s brigade of South Carolinians retreated across the bridge but Federal troops, fearing their position would be too exposed, chose not to chase Henagan across the river. They decided to wait until the next day to attempt the crossing. Interestingly, during the Telegraph Road fighting, Union artillery fire hit the Fox House where General Lee was directing the battle. Lee himself was almost hit by one of the rounds.
Ox Ford
Meanwhile at 11 a.m. of that same day, elements of Brig. Gen. William H. Mahone’s division raced to stop an attempted Union advance across the North Anna at Ox Ford. This was at the center of what was to become a six-mile wide battlefield. Mahone ordered the placement of his Confederate cannon at a strategic position high on a point that appears to be about 80 to 100 feet above the Ox Ford crossing of the river. (The area today is apparently much more wooded than it was at the time of the battle.) It is readily apparent to anyone visiting this position at the top of what was to become Lee’s famous “inverted V” that any direct assault on that position from the Union side of the river would have been up an impossibly high and steep slope. From the inverted V, the Confederate field of fire is said to have covered the Chesterfield Bridge, Ox Ford and other points west towards Quarles Mill as well—a wide field of fire indeed.
Jericho Mill
On the afternoon of that same May 23, 1864, the Union’s V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, forded the North Anna River at Jericho Mill at the western end of the river and marched, initially uncontested, on to Fontaine Farm on the river’s south bank. Before long, however, Warren’s forces were attacked by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill’s III Corps. A serious battle broke out and, initially, it looked as though the Hill’s forces would force Warren’s troops back to the north side of the river. However, Warren’s men rallied and were able to establish a beachhead on the south side of the river.
There is some controversy regarding how it came to pass that Hill allowed the Federals to establish a position on the south bank of the river at Jericho Mill. Hill’s Third Corps had been guarding the east-west running Virginia Central Railroad along what is now Verdon Road. Hill had been told by Lee that Warren’s initial movements in the area were a mere feint. Hill did eventually commit his forces in strength at Jericho Mill. However, after Warren was able to establish a beachhead on the south bank of the river, Lee scolded Hill for not throwing all of his forces into the battle—to use Lee’s words, “as Jackson would have done.”
In response to Union advances, by the evening of May 23rd Lee’s forces were able to construct defensive earthworks several miles long. These earthworks ran from the nearby Little River, to the point mentioned above overlooking and opposite Ox Ford. They then turned southeast and ran a considerable distance toward Hanover Junction– thus forming Lee’s famous “inverted V.” The inverted V not only commanded high ground at its center, but it also acted as a force multiplier against Union forces who were split by it on both sides. A confident Lee said, “if I can get one more pull at [Grant], I will defeat him,”
MAY 24th, Telegraph Road
Early in the morning of the 24th, the Union’s II Corps easily crossed the Chesterfield Bridge against little resistance and was able to advance far enough down Telegraph Road south of the river to take the same Fox House where Lee had almost been hit the day before. Further east, the Confederates had managed to burn the RFP railroad bridge about a quarter mile away. Nevertheless, Union forces were still able to cross it and then later make a pontoon bridge that allowed them to cross the river in even greater numbers. The relative ease of Grant’s initial success gave him cause to believe that the Confederates were retreating.
Soon elements of the Hancock’s II Corps marched south along the RFP railroad, despite taking fire from rebel sharpshooters, until they reached earthworks defended by brigades from Alabama and North Carolina who were positioned just north of Hanover Junction. The rebels counter attacked and fierce fighting erupted. Thunderstorms, however, dampened gunpowder and eventually stalled the fighting near Verdon Road.
Jericho Mill
That same day to the West, Wright’s Union VI Corps crossed the North Anna at Jericho Mills in support of Warren’s V Corps who had established their beachhead there the night before. Federal troops were able to advance south to the Virginia Central Railroad line along present day Verdon Road. This is because by that time A.P. Hill’s forces had fallen back and dug in at the western leg of Lee’s inverted V.
Ox Ford
Meanwhile Grant, seeing the initial lack of resistance at Telegraph Road, and hearing of Warren’s advance in the West, mistakenly believed that rebel forces above Ox Ford only constituted a token force who were left solely for the purpose of covering what he thought was a retreating Lee. Thus, Grant ordered Burnside’s IX Corps to attempt to secure a river crossing at Ox Ford at the center of the battlefield. Burnside, wishing to avoid fire from Confederate guns, ordered Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden’s division to go upstream and west to Quarles Mill, which is between Jericho Mill and Ox Ford, to ford the river there. Crittenden was then to move east and to attack Ox Ford from the southern end of the river. The brigade spearheading this attack was led by Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, who was apparently intoxicated. He failed to follow orders to wait for additional troops and, instead, ordered an immediate assault on the western side of Lee’s inverted V. The result was a hail of Confederate bullets that caused Ledlie’s forces to retreat back in the direction of Quarles Mill. Here again, however, the fighting was stalled by severe thunderstorms.
Evening, May 24th
At the end of the day, Lee’s inverted V remained intact. Grant’s forces were divided into three parts along the river, and no portion of his army could easily support the other. Unfortunately, Lee himself had contracted a case of diarrhea during the fighting and was not able to direct a decisive counter attack. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, perhaps Lee’s most trusted Corps commander after the death of Stonewall Jackson a year earlier, had been severely wounded at the Wilderness and was not present to provide any needed leadership. Moreover, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart had died almost two weeks earlier as a result of a wound received at Yellow Tavern. In any event, Union troops were now also digging in north of river.
MAY 25th and 26th
Sniper and the artillery duels continued for two more days. By the evening of May 26th, however, Grant grasped the risks faced by an army whose wings could not reinforce each other. As he had done at the Wilderness and again at Spotsylvania, Grant ordered his army to the East and then South around Lee’s right to what would be the Battle of Cold Harbor and then later, after crossing the James River, to the Siege of Petersburg.