[Opinion and Analysis.]
[Author’s Note: This article should not be read as either supporting or condemning U.S. support for Ukraine or Taiwan. Nor should it be read as a blanket endorsement of Mr. Kissinger’s policies or those of the Nixon or Ford Administrations. Its purpose is merely to raise some important questions and points that are too often overlooked.]
An article by Timothy Nerozzi appeared on a Fox News website on November 30, 2023. In it he reports on the reaction of Vladimir Putin and his lieutenant, Dmitry Medvedev, to the recent death of former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Very interestingly, both praised Henry Kissinger in relatively glowing terms. They expressed some regret and frustration that today’s American leaders aren’t more like Mr. Kissinger. Xi Jinping, the leader of China, seems to have had a similarly positive opinion of Kissinger.*
It’s easy to dismiss the comments of the two Russian leaders as being nothing more than an expression of the normal condolences for a recently departed former friend or acquaintance. Given the present conflict in Ukraine, and the way the Russian leadership has spoken about the U.S. in the last couple of years however, Putin’s, Medvedev’s and Xi’s comments deserve very special attention. Why? Are the Russians dropping hints that peace in Ukraine is possible? Of course, the same question could be asked about resolving the Chinese relationship with Taiwan.
In any event, U.S. and NATO policy makers should now be asking themselves questions such as:
- What was it about Kissinger’s policies or approach to foreign policy that is different from present U.S. foreign policy?
- More specifically, what would Kissinger have said about NATO membership for Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, the Baltic states and/or any other post 1990 candidate for membership in NATO? What would he say about China and it’s claims to Taiwan?
- Didn’t Kissinger adhere to notions that peace required a balance of power in international affairs?
- Didn’t Kissinger espouse the view that the superpowers had legitimate spheres of influence, and that those spheres should not be encroached upon by the other superpowers?
- How is Kissinger’s approach similar to and/or different from policies which define good guys and bad guys in terms of whether their governments were autocratic or democratic? Same question, but an approach which equates capitalism with goodness and communism with fiendishness? And, regardless of one defines friends and enemies, should the U.S. engage in policymaking designed to prevent, resist, contest and/or eliminate the other side’s ability to spread their influence anywhere, any time by any means, including forceful and military ones?
The question, at least initially, should not be whether Kissinger’s policies were good or bad or, for that matter, moral or immoral. Regardless of whether Kissinger’s philosophy and diplomatic tactics were good or bad, it seems clear that there is or was something in his policies and diplomatic style that the Russians and Chinese both found far less objectionable, if not more reassuring, than those that the U.S. is using right now. As such, any party serious about finding a way to lessen the threat to world peace posed by the situation in Ukraine, Taiwan and in other global hotspots would be well advised to figure out what that something is, and if, it is still workable and otherwise still in the interests of the United States to do so, to utilize it.
To take a specific example, it would be very interesting to know whether Kissinger would have allowed any serious public discussion about Ukraine joining NATO in the years immediately prior to 2022. Would Kissinger have strongly impressed on European and Ukrainian leaders the idea that even publicly suggesting Ukrainian NATO membership was a bad idea because it would be perceived by the Russians as a clear threat to them. It would almost be like the Russians and Cuba proposing that Texas (a former Confederate state) become allied with Russia immediately after the Civil War. Kissinger, were he still Secretary of State, might well have also had serious reservations about Finland and Sweden joining NATO as being similarly provocative. One must remember that NATO’s expansion eastward through former Soviet-bloc countries towards Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 was already cause for very serious alarm in Moscow. For many of these same reasons, Kissinger might also have had similar reservations about Ukraine joining the economically prosperous European Union.
In short, since 1990 Russia has probably felt very pushed around by the U.S., the E.U. and NATO. The U.S. invasions of Iraq did nothing to calm Russian jitters in this regard. While the Afghanistan invasion was probably even more discomforting to the Russians, at least 9/11 provided some superficial justification for military intervention in that rather unique situation. And, given the fact that both the Russia and Britain (not to mention Alexander the Great) have, on many occasions, learned the hard way that invading Afghanistan is always a bad idea, the Russians probably just rubbed their hands with glee at the thought of the misfortune the U.S. was likely to experience when it invaded that very remote, rugged and landlocked country in the heart of Asia.
The point, however, is that Russia’s attempts to subvert the newly established increasingly West-leaning democratic government of Ukraine in the years prior to 2022 seems a lot less evil and a lot more understandable if one considers the foregoing. In short, Russia has, for the last 33 years, felt very pushed around by the West and even worse, that the Western powers were, and are now, threatening Russia’s traditional interests right at her very doorstep. And one needs to remember that throughout Ukraine’s rather tumultuous and complicated history she has during significant periods been part of the Russian and/or Soviet empire. Suffice it to say that much of the foregoing, may not have been adequately appreciated by American foreign policy makers during the last 20 or 30 years. Ukraine was split off from, and made independent of, Russia 30 years or so ago. While most proponents of democracy rightfully believe that the citizens of an independent country, such as Ukraine, should always have the right of self-determination, Western leaders have been largely blind as to Russian sensitivities and what the probable consequences of their pre-2022 policies and actions would be.
To be clear, however, Putin and Russia had no right to invade Ukraine. But this situation is much like that found in the HAMAS/Israeli conflict. HAMAS engaged in horrific terroristic acts against Israel a few short weeks ago. However, for decades now Israel has expanded settlements and, from the Palestinian perspective, generally tolerated, caused and/or contributed to the adverse conditions, under which Gazans and Palestinians have suffered. And this, in turn, arguably made HAMAS’s terrorism foreseeable, if not totally avoidable by Israel. Simply put, if you abuse someone, there is a very good chance that they will eventually become vicious and violent, even if they weren’t originally disposed to being that way. In many respects, terrorism is nothing but another, albeit less noble, form of revolt. It is also a form of revenge. In this regard, need we be reminded that our own country was founded by revolting revolutionaries who were tired of oppression?
In any event, what’s happened has happened. The clock cannot be turned back. One can make some strong arguments that more should have been done to prevent the Ukrainian conflict and/or that the U.S. should have avoided getting involved in the first place. However, the simple unfortunate fact of the matter is that almost 2 years have now gone by since the start of that conflict. The situation has significantly changed. The Ukrainian war has caused not only a tremendous loss of life, but nationwide devastation and the migration (much of it forced by Russian occupiers) of substantial portions of the native population. Much of the country lies in total ruin and the national makeup of the remaining population might well be different than what it was pre-war. And most importantly, the consequences of an unfavorable outcome to the Ukrainian conflict are simply immense because the whole balance of power in Europe, and ultimately the rest of the World are likely to be affected by its outcome. Why? Because once again, policy makers have started thinking in old Cold War terms. Namely, they have started worrying about the same “domino effect” scenarios, that were a constant worry decades ago, where America’s foreign policy was largely driven by the fear that if one country falls to Russian influence then its neighbors (in this case European ones) are sure to follow. And, in this regard, will the fall of Ukraine also make Taiwan a more attractive target for China? Clearly, in a worst-case scenario, Russia would again have a substantial presence in, if not control over, large portions of Europe and China would have achieved a foothold to gaining naval and military supremacy in Southeast Asia and the Southern Pacific, not to mention newfound dominance and control over much of the World’s computer chip technology and distribution. These events would shift the balance of power in the world in a way that would be against U.S. interests.
Admittedly, hindsight is 20/20. The trouble is that today’s leaders operate in a rather superficial attention grabbing, click-bait society where the history of international affairs may not be sufficiently appreciated. One cannot help but to sometimes think that if today’s world leaders were more like Henry Kissinger that the World might be a safer place.
[End notes appear below this article.]
David Dixon Lentz December 3, 2023
© Copyright 2023, David Dixon Lentz, All Rights Reserved.
ENDNOTES:
* We will table an exhaustive discussion of the pros and cons of Kissinger’s legacy and/or whether his policies were moral or immoral. Suffice it to say, that it’s very easy for many progressives to condemn Kissinger and his policies. The view here, however, is that leaders of Kissinger’s ilk were products of those intensely conflicted times—namely WWII, Korea and then Vietnam. No conflict since then can approach those turbulent times in terms of the amount of blood being shed. This would naturally affect a policymaker’s moral values, and thus have a strong influence on their policy making decisions. In this regard, unlike most of today’s progressives, Kissinger’s and his Jewish family experienced and fled the horrors of Nazi Germany and he was more than aware of the evil menace of Stalin and Soviet Russia. Often progressives make the mistake of judging political figures at a present day safe distance, free from the dangers, pressures and constraints posed by the times in which political leaders operated.
This quote from Wikipedia in its article on “Realpolitik” is both very relevant and interesting:
While generally used as a positive or neutral term, Realpolitik has been also used pejoratively to imply political policies that are perceived as being coercive, amoral, or Machiavellian.[1] Prominent proponents of Realpolitik include Otto von Bismarck, Henry Kissinger, George F. Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deng Xiaoping, Charles De Gaulle, and Lee Kuan Yew
In short, most politicians of Kissinger’s era would have been very happy to have their name mentioned in the same breath with the foregoing list of leaders. More importantly, however, one might ask: Did not Kissinger’s policies open up China and help to maintain peace with the former U.S.S.R? In short, was not the world eventually made a more peaceful place because of Kissinger and his policies? A very strong argument could be made that it was.
Regarding Kissinger’s legacy in South and Central America and Southeast Asia, his policies have to be judged in the context of the pervasive fear that existed for decades in the U.S. after WWII of the spread of Communism, such as in Castro’s Cuba, Korea and Vietnam. Regarding the Caribbean, Central and South America, one has to remember that American foreign policy had traditionally based upon the foundational concepts of the then 150 year old Monroe Doctrine—which Kissinger was largely continuing. Moreover, Kissinger found himself confronted by many warlike adversaries in a dangerous and violent world, not to mention hostile nuclear powers such the U.S.S.R. and Red China. There was a time in the not too distant past when looking out for America’s best interest as Kissinger thought he was doing, would not have been viewed as a sin, but as a regretful necessity. Looked at realistically, Laotian and Cambodian leaders should have done a better job than they did of keeping large numbers of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops out of their countries. By not doing so, both Laos and Cambodia were providing at least tacit support to America’s enemies. If they had kept North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong out of their countries, the U.S. would not have felt at all compelled to bomb those areas that harbored Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops.
And finally, no one should forget that Kissinger played a predominant role in ending the conflict in Vietnam, and in fact won a Nobel Peace prize for his efforts.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, strong arguments can be made that Kissinger failed to take into account the possible longer term and broader negative social and political ramifications of his policies. This is particularly true in South and Central America where, unlike Vietnam, America did not have to worry about finding a safe way and honorable way to get American troops out of a violent war that raged all about them. But here again, the example of communist expansion into Cuba and the Russian instigation of 1962 missile crisis loomed large in every American policymaker’s head, including Kissinger’s.